Poland holds 90 days of strategic petroleum reserves under IEA and EU law. The oil sits in underground salt caverns near Inowroclaw, tank farms at Gdansk, and 19 product depots across the country. On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel launched strikes on Iran. The Strait of Hormuz effectively closed. Brent crude hit USD 120 per barrel before settling near USD 107 in May. On 11 March 2026, the IEA triggered its largest-ever collective reserve release of 426 million barrels. Poland participated. Here is how the Polish system works, where everything is located, and what the current crisis looks like from Warsaw.
Poland is subject to two overlapping strategic petroleum reserve frameworks. As an IEA member state, Poland operates under the Agreement on an International Energy Programme of 1974, which requires each member country to hold emergency oil stocks equivalent to at least 90 days of net oil imports and to be ready to participate in coordinated collective actions in response to severe supply disruptions. As an EU member state, Poland is also subject to EU Council Directive 2009/119/EC, which requires EU member states to maintain minimum oil stocks equivalent to 90 days of average daily net imports or 61 days of average daily inland consumption, whichever is greater, and to report stock levels to the European Commission quarterly.
Poland has a comprehensive and tested legislative and regulatory framework in place to respond to an oil emergency. The Act on Stocks sets a 90-day stockholding obligation which is realised in Poland through a mixed system. Intervention stocks in the country are held in the form of obligated industry stocks, created and maintained by producers and traders to the tune of 53 days; and public stocks maintained by the Strategic Reserve Agency (RARS) of 37 days, which bring the country's total emergency stocks to 90 days. Poland has been consistently compliant with the IEA 90-day stockholding obligation and does not hold stocks overseas.
The division between industry stocks and public stocks is the critical structural feature. Industry stocks are held by fuel producers and traders operating in Poland, primarily PKN Orlen, which operates Poland's two refineries and the largest retail fuel network, as well as by other traders active in the Polish petroleum market. These companies are legally obligated under the Act on Stocks to maintain their share of the 53-day industry obligation. The remaining 37 days are maintained by RARS, the Strategic Reserve Agency, which holds stocks on behalf of the Polish state in facilities owned by storage companies, primarily PERN and IKS Solino. Poland holds no stocks overseas and has no bilateral stockholding agreements with other IEA countries, unlike some smaller EU member states that store part of their reserves in neighbouring countries under bilateral arrangements permitted by the IEA framework.
Two crude oil tank farms with a combined capacity of 15 million barrels are located near the Naftoport and refinery in Gdansk. Crude oil is also stored in seven underground salt caverns with 26.4 million barrels of capacity that are connected to the west section of the Druzhba pipeline at a site owned by IKS Solino, a subsidiary of PKN Orlen. This site also has 11.3 million barrels of oil products storage capacity in three salt caverns connected by pipeline to the Plock refinery. Additional oil products storage capacity of 13.5 million barrels is spread across Poland at 19 storage depots owned by PERN. The five largest of these depots are connected by pipeline to the Plock refinery.
Seven underground salt caverns with 26.4 million barrels of crude oil storage capacity, connected to the western section of the Druzhba pipeline. Three additional salt caverns hold 11.3 million barrels of petroleum products, connected by pipeline to the PKN Orlen Plock refinery. IKS Solino is a PKN Orlen subsidiary. The Druzhba pipeline connection was historically Poland's primary crude oil import route from Russia. Since 2022, Poland has largely replaced Russian crude with seaborne imports through Naftoport at Gdansk, making the Druzhba west section connection less commercially active but still operational for storage access.
Two crude oil tank farms with combined capacity of 15 million barrels, located adjacent to the Naftoport crude oil import terminal and the Lotos (now PKN Orlen) refinery in Gdansk near the Baltic Sea. Naftoport is Poland's primary crude oil import terminal, with capacity to handle approximately 36 million tonnes of crude per year arriving by VLCC and Suezmax tankers from the North Sea, Middle East, West Africa, and North America. The Gdansk tank farm complex is the frontline of Poland's crude import infrastructure and the first storage point for seaborne crude before it moves by pipeline to Plock or Gdansk refineries.
Poland's largest refinery at 343,000 barrels per day of processing capacity, located in Plock in central Poland. The Plock refinery is the commercial and strategic centre of Polish petroleum product production, manufacturing petrol, diesel, jet fuel, heating oil, LPG, and petrochemicals. It is connected by pipeline to the Solino salt cavern storage complex and to five of PERN's largest product depots across Poland. PKN Orlen completed a EUR 2 billion Olefins Complex expansion at Plock in early 2025, the largest petrochemical investment in Europe in 20 years, increasing domestic petrochemical production capacity.
Poland's second refinery at 213,000 barrels per day of processing capacity, formerly Lotos, located near the Baltic port of Gdansk. The Gdansk refinery was acquired by PKN Orlen in 2022 following EU merger approval, making PKN Orlen the sole refiner in Poland. A EUR 600 million EFRA project completed in 2019 increased Gdansk's diesel and jet fuel production capacity by approximately 20,000 barrels per day. Both Polish refineries have been running at close to full capacity in recent years, supporting both commercial fuel supply and strategic reserve replenishment obligations.
PERN, Poland's pipeline and petroleum product logistics operator, operates 19 petroleum product storage depots across the country with combined capacity of 13.5 million barrels. The five largest depots are pipeline-connected to the Plock refinery, providing fast replenishment capacity. Named depot sites include Adamowo, Debogore, Gora, Koluszki, Miszewko, Rejowiec, and others distributed across Poland's major regional fuel distribution hubs. PERN has plans to add 1.2 million barrels of additional product storage capacity at existing depots.
Eight underground gas storage facilities with total active working gas capacity of approximately 3.6 billion cubic metres, operated by PGNiG, now part of PKN Orlen. Sites include Wierzchowice (largest in Poland, approximately 1.2 Bcm), Husow, Strachocina, Swarzow, Brzeznio, Daszewo, Bonikowo, and Kosakowo. Fill levels are published daily on the AGSI platform operated by Gas Infrastructure Europe. Poland's gas storage capacity represents approximately 14-15% of annual domestic consumption, a lower ratio than Germany or Italy.
Oil prices have gyrated wildly since the United States and Israel launched joint air strikes on Iran on 28 February. Disruptions to Middle Eastern supplies due to attacks on the region's oil infrastructure and the cessation of tanker traffic through the Strait of Hormuz sent Brent futures soaring, trading within a whisker of USD 120 per barrel. Prices subsequently eased with Brent around USD 92 per barrel at the time of writing, up USD 20 per barrel for the month.
The Strait of Hormuz context is critical. The war in the region that began on 28 February has impeded energy trade flows through the Strait, creating the largest supply disruption in the history of the global oil market. Global gas markets have also been affected, with about 20% of the world's supply of liquefied natural gas having moved through the Strait in 2025. The IEA's Executive Director has said the combined impacts amount to the greatest threat to global energy security in history.
The conflict is also having a significant impact on global product markets. Gulf producers exported 3.3 million barrels per day of refined products and 1.5 million barrels per day of LPG in 2025. More than 3 million barrels per day of refining capacity in the region has already shut due to attacks and a lack of viable export outlets. Diesel and jet fuel markets are particularly vulnerable, given limited flexibility elsewhere in the world to increase output of middle distillates at the scale required to replace Gulf production.
Poland participated in this collective release as an IEA member state. The specific volume of Poland's contribution to the collective release has not been published separately from the aggregate European commitment, but European IEA member states as a bloc contributed a proportionate share. The Brent crude oil spot price averaged USD 107 per barrel in May, USD 10 per barrel lower than the average in April, the first monthly average decline in prices since December 2025. Although oil price volatility remains elevated, prices fell in May as numerous reports surfaced that the United States and Iran were nearing an agreement to extend the existing ceasefire and re-open the Strait of Hormuz pending future negotiations.
Poland's specific vulnerability in the current crisis is shaped by its crude oil import geography. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Poland made rapid and largely complete substitution of Russian crude with Atlantic basin crude delivered through Naftoport in Gdansk: North Sea crude, West African crude, and American crude. This import geography gives Poland a notably lower direct exposure to Strait of Hormuz disruption than Asian IEA members like Japan or South Korea, which sourced a much larger share of their crude from Gulf producers, or than some Mediterranean EU members more dependent on Middle Eastern feedstocks.
The vulnerability for Poland in the current crisis is not crude oil supply. It is the global price impact and the specific product markets. Even with Atlantic crude supply routes intact, Poland pays world oil prices for its crude, and those prices have risen materially since 28 February. PKN Orlen's refinery margins are affected by feedstock cost inflation. Polish transport fuel retail prices have risen, though the government has maintained the reduced VAT and excise rates on fuel that were introduced after the Russia-Ukraine war to limit consumer price impact. The diesel vulnerability is the more specific concern: Gulf producers supplied a disproportionate share of global diesel and middle distillate exports, and the shutdown of Gulf refining capacity has tightened the global diesel market in ways that are felt across Poland's road freight and agricultural sectors regardless of where Poland sources its crude.
Natural gas is Poland's second energy security concern in the current crisis. Global gas markets have been affected by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, with about 20% of the world's supply of LNG having moved through the Strait in 2025. The disruption of transit via the Strait of Hormuz has reduced LNG supplies from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates by over 300 million cubic metres per day since 1 March. As of mid-June, Dutch TTF, the European benchmark for natural gas prices, stood 35% above pre-war levels. Poland's gas supply has been substantially diversified since 2022: the Baltic Pipe connecting Polish demand directly to Norwegian gas fields via Denmark opened in October 2022, the Swinoujscie LNG terminal on the Baltic coast handles Atlantic basin LNG, and the domestic gas production from PGNIG's Polish fields contributes a meaningful share. Qatar, whose Ras Laffan LNG facility has been offline since an attack on 2 March, was a supplier to the global LNG pool that Poland buys from. The 35% TTF gas price increase is directly impacting Polish industry and household heating costs.
Based on assumptions around the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and the gradual resumption of oil trade flows, the EIA forecasts total liquid fuels inventories in OECD countries will fall to just under 2.3 billion barrels by December 2026, which would be the lowest level since 2003 and well below the previous five-year average of 2.8 billion barrels. On a days-of-supply basis, OECD inventories are expected to fall to a low of 50 days by the end of 2026, which would be the fewest days since the EIA's dataset begins.
For Poland specifically, the 90-day reserve obligation provides a statutory floor that Poland has consistently maintained above the minimum. The reserve system was designed precisely for this kind of scenario: a major supply disruption that cannot be resolved immediately, requiring a buffer of domestic stock to sustain normal commercial supply while diplomatic and military resolution of the underlying cause is pursued. The IEA's 426 million barrel collective release is a demand-side bridge: it adds volume to global markets to compensate partially for the lost Hormuz flows, buying time for a ceasefire or agreement to allow Strait traffic to resume. Flows through the Strait are assumed to slowly start resuming in the third quarter of 2026. If flows resume within this timeframe, it is expected to take until early 2027 for production and trade patterns to generally return to pre-conflict status.
| Parameter | Pre-Crisis (Dec 2025) | Current Status (July 2026) |
|---|---|---|
| Brent crude price | ~USD 72/bbl | ~USD 92-107/bbl (volatile) |
| Strait of Hormuz flows | ~20 mb/d | Near zero (de facto closed) |
| Gulf oil production cut | Normal | At least 10 mb/d cut |
| IEA collective release | None | 426 mb committed from 11 March |
| OECD inventories | ~2.8 billion barrels (5yr avg) | Falling toward 2.3B bbl by Dec 2026 |
| OECD days of supply | Normal | Forecast 50 days by end 2026 |
| TTF gas price | Normal | +35% above pre-war levels (mid-June) |
| Poland crude supply route | Atlantic via Naftoport | Intact (lower Hormuz exposure) |
| Poland 90-day SPR compliance | Compliant | Compliant (participating in IEA release) |
| Strait reopening forecast | N/A | Q3 2026 assumed (ceasefire negotiations) |
Poland's strategic petroleum reserve system is doing what it was designed to do. The 90-day mixed industry-public stock system, maintained consistently above the IEA minimum across both Labour and conservative governments for decades, provides a statutory buffer that insulates Polish fuel supply from short-term global disruptions. The Naftoport import terminal at Gdansk and the Atlantic crude supply routes that Poland shifted to after 2022, when Russian crude was replaced with North Sea, West African, and American oil, mean that Poland's physical crude supply chain does not run through the Strait of Hormuz. That structural advantage, which cost significant diplomatic and commercial effort to establish in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war, is now proving its value in a completely different crisis that nobody anticipated in 2022.
The vulnerabilities are real but manageable in the near term. Global oil prices are elevated regardless of where Poland sources its crude, because oil is a global commodity with a global price. Polish consumers are paying more at the pump and Polish industry is paying more for diesel, heating oil, and LPG than they were before 28 February. The gas price impact, with TTF at 35% above pre-war levels, is affecting Polish industry's energy costs and the economics of Polish gas-fired power generation. These are genuine economic costs that will weigh on Polish GDP growth in 2026 relative to pre-crisis forecasts. They are not an energy security crisis of the kind that would require Poland to activate emergency demand restraint measures or ration fuel supply.
The scenario to watch is a prolonged Strait closure beyond Q3 2026. OECD inventories are forecast to fall to 50 days of supply by the end of 2026 if flows resume within the assumed timeframe. If flows do not resume on that timeline, the drawdown of strategic reserves accelerates. At 400 million barrels released against 105 million barrels per day of global consumption, the IEA release covers just four days of global demand. The mathematics of strategic reserves against a genuinely prolonged supply disruption are uncomfortable for the global system as a whole. Poland's position within that global system is better than most IEA members, but no country is insulated from a sustained multi-month closure of the world's most critical oil transit chokepoint.
This article is produced by Fides Polonia Capital Management for informational purposes only. Data on Polish strategic petroleum reserve infrastructure from IEA's Poland Oil Security Policy assessment. Global market data from IEA Oil Market Report March 2026, IEA Middle East Global Energy Markets page, US EIA Strategic Petroleum Reserve data, and US EIA Short-Term Energy Outlook June 2026. Iran conflict context from IEA and US EIA public sources as cited. Fides Polonia Capital Management has no financial interest in PKN Orlen, PERN, IKS Solino, RARS, GAZ-SYSTEM, or any other energy infrastructure company referenced in this article. Nothing in this article constitutes investment advice. This article does not constitute a political position on the conflict in the Middle East.